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STu ET NomEs
public are mere busybodies. And this usually small group often succeeds in making dupes of other men, equally prominent, but not
fully informed as to the matter in issue. The average citizen becomes
hopelessly confused. It is a fortunate thing, in such instances, that
prescription cannot be maintained against the public, and that these
citizens have at least a fighting chance of abating a nuisance, or of
repossessing themselves of public property.
BYo H. PUiMR Y.
CouiTY AND MUNIciPL IN E~mrNns&S.--In composing this note no
distinction between the indebtedness of a county and that of municipalities of the various classes will be attempted.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held in a recent case, that a
municipality of the third class, without a vote of the people, may issue
bonds to fund a floating indebtedness, if legally incurred, which has
accumulated through a course of years, even though the aggregate
amount of the indebtedness is in excess of the amount of revenue
"provided" for the year in which the bonds are issued. Hall v. City of
Hopkznsville, et al., 46 S. W (2d) 497 (Ky. 1932).
The decision is based upon both constitutional and statutory provisions, together with a long line of previous decisions, all of which
shall be discussed subsequently. Sections 157, 158 of the Kentucky
Constitution; Kentucky Statutes, 3284; Vaughn v. City of Corbzn, 217
Ky. 521, 289 S. W 1104; Wilson v. Cowngton, 220 Ky. 798, 295 S. W
1068; Baker, et al. v. Rockcastle County Court, 225 Ky. 99, 7 S. W (2d)
846.
Section 157 of the Kentucky Constitution was passed for the purpose of curbing such gross indebtedness as was sure to come and the
language there used appears to be very clear and conclusive.
Section 157 provides as follows: "No county, city, town, taxing
district, or other municipality, shall be authorized or permitted to become indebted, in any manner or for any purpose, to an amount exceeding, in any year, the income and revenue provided for such year,
without the assent of two-thirds of the voters thereof, voting at an
election to be held for that purpose; and any indebtedness contracted
In violation of this section shall be void. Nor shall such contract be
enforceable by the person with whom made; nor shall such municipality ever be authorized to assume the same."
Even though the language is distinct, the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, by "seizing" upon two words in the provision, has almost
destroyed the entire meaning and effect of the section. The words
which have afforded them the loophole are: "provided," and "indebtedness." In City of Provmdence v. Providence Electrsc Light Company,
122 Ky. 237, 91 S. W. 664, Carrol, J., said as to the meaning of the
word "provided:" "it is the amount of tax that may be leved and
raised under the Constitution that must be looked to in determining
whether or not the indebtedness 'exceeds in any year the income and
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revenue provided for such year (and not what is actually being raised,
or supposed to be raised).'"
Chief Justice Dietzman of the present Kentucky Court of Appeals
thinks Judge Carroll went too far in reaching this result. For his comment on the subject see 20 Ky. L. Jour. 75. The rule ought to be, it
seems, that the amount of revenue being actually assessed should determine the extent of indebtedness.
This brings us to the next word, namely, "indebtedness." In construing this word the court has defined it very narrowly in holding
that it only refers to indebtedness created by contract. O'Bryan, City
Clerk v. City of Owensboro, 113 lRy. 680, 68 S. W 858. This definition
is the same as that put upon the word in Section 49 of the Kentucky
Constitution, and as a result, says C. J. Dietzman, 20 Ky. L. Jour. 75,
"there are millions of outstanding state warrants we now have with
no income wherewith to pay them."
The interpretation of this word further weakens the effect of the
constitutional provision under consideration and many unworthy
officials are fast applying to the courts for their aid in carrying into
effect indebtedness which should not have been allowed under any circumstances.
It should be noted in the discussion above that the courts in Kentucky, at least, make a distinction between legally contracted indebtedness, and an indebtedness created by means in violation of the constitutional prohibition. Not only do the courts make this distinction,
but it is specifically set out in Section 3284 of the Kentucky Statutes
which provides as follows. "The common council shall also have the
power to issue bonds in renewal of any bonds theretofore lawfully
issued, and to fund any floating indebtedness of the city lawfully contracted." This special statute only applies to third class cities, and an
interesting question arises whether or not this limitation applies to
all the other units mentioned in Section 157 of the Kentucky Constitution. In our opinion it should, and it Is believed, that the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky would so hold.
Section 157 having determined what shall be deemed lawful indebtedness, let us see in what manner units other than third class
cities, pursue in issuing bonds to cover an indebtedness legally created.
We will have to turn to Section 158 of the Kentucky Constitution for
this power. It states: "Nothing herein shall prevent the issue of renewal bonds to fund the floating indebtedness of any city, town, county,
taxing district, or other municipality."
From this provision it is clear that the only limitation upon the
power of a county or municipality to issue bonds to fund a floating
indebtedness is that already mentioned in Section 3284 of the Kentucky Statutes, viz., that the existing indebtedness shall be lawfully
created. Section 3284 of the Kentucky Statutes; Hall v. City of Hopkinsville, supra.
The decision in Hall v. City of Hopkznsville follows the case of
Vaughn v. City of Corbin, 217 Ky. 521, 289 S. W 1104. The latter case
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absolutely destroyed the check placed upon counties and municipalities
by the decision in Mcarocklin v. Nelson County Fiscal Court, 174 Ky.
308. The court held in the latter case that an indebtedness created in
a previous year or years, and remaining unpaid, must be counted in
computing the indebtedness winch the county may incur in a subsequent year under Section 157 of the Constitution.
There has been however, in all the cases following Vaughn v. City
of Corbin, vigorous dissents, but the ruling in that case, affirmed by
the case of Hall v. City of Hopkznsville, is without question, the state
law upon the subject.
Consequently, under our present law, a county or municipality
may issue bonds to cover a floating indebtedness, in excess of the
revenue provided for in that year, if such indebtedness has been lawfully created, without submitting the question to the voters.
Now let us turn briefly to the power of a county or municipality
to issue bonds to cover an indebtedness illegally created. Or, to state
it differently, to substitute valid bonds for an illegal debt. Before a
county or municipality can issue valid bonds in this instance the
question must be submitted to the voters at an election to be held for
that purpose. See Section 157 of- the Kentucky Constitution; City
Council v. Powell, 16 K. L. R. 174, 27 S. W 1.
It was held in Montgomery County Fiscal Court v. Trimble, 20
K. L. R. 827, 104 Ky. 629, 47 S. W. 773, that such an election must be
held on the day of a regular election and the assent of two-thirds of
those voting upon the question submitted is sufficient. For further
reference see Board of Education v. City of Winchester, 120 Ky. 591,
27 K. L. R. 994, 87 S. W. 768.
Notice should be taken of the court's interpretation of the phrase
within the Constitution, Section 157, that reads as follows: "'
out the assent of two-thirds of the voters thereof." They have in the
cases just mentioned asserted the rule to be that only the sanction of
two-thirds of those voting on that particular issue is necessary to
adopt it. This overrules a line of cases which held that the assent
of two-thirds of the electors actually voting at the general election
when the question is submitted, is necessary to carry it, and not merely
two-thirds of those who vote upon that particular question. Belknap v.
City of Louisville, 99 Ky. 474, 18 K. L. R. 313, 36 S. W 1118; City v.
Baker, 18 K. L. R. 324, 37 S. W 481, City of Ashland v. Culbertson,
19 K. L. R. 1812, 103 Ky. 161, 44 S. W. 441.
From these decisions there is no doubt but that the state court
requires a submission of the issue to the voters before a county or
municipality can issue bonds to cover an indebtedness illegally created,
or go in debt in excess of the amount of revenue provided for that year.
Do the Federal courts follow tins distinction? Sad to relate, but
none the less true, the Federal rule is even more drastic than the
decisions handed down in Kentucky by their own courts. From the
rule laid down in the.Federal courts, it seems to matter none whatever, whether or not the debt was legally or illegally contracted. It
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was held in a Federal case, Gunnison County Commsssioners v. Rollis,
173 U. S. 255, where a county had issued bonds under a similar statutory provision to that of Kentucky's, "that as against the plaintiff,
the County of Gunnison is estopped to question the recital in the bonds
in question to the effect that they did and were issued by virtue and
in conformity with the statute, and in full compliance with the requirements of law." Thus, a dishonest officer, by a mere recital in the
bonds to the effect that they were executed in compliance with the
constitutional provisions, can evade the whole effect of such provisions
and the bonds or indebtedness will be deemed valid despite the fact
that they may go far beyond the amount of revenue provided for the
year in which they are issued, and without being submitted to the
voters. This doctrine has already been applied in our own Federal
courts. Mercer County v. Byer, 1 F (2d) 609; State Bank of N. Y. v.
Henderson County, 35 F (2d) 859. For a comment on this question see Federal Judge Dawson's article in 20 Ky. L. Jour. 3. The
learned judge there declares: "Personally, I do not think the Federal
rule is right. In effect if permits a group of county or city officials
whose freedom of action it was the intention of the Constitution to
curb, to violate the constitutional provision with impunity, by reciting
a falsehood in the note or other paper, evidencing the illegal indebtedness which they create." However, Judge Dawson, instead of ruling
otherwise, was apparently bound by the decision in Gunnison County
Commissioners v. Rollins, and held that bonds so issued were valid in
State Bank of N. Y. v. Henderson County, supra.
In our opinion neither the state or Federal rule is proper. Neither
appear to obtain the result intended by the framers of our Constitution.
We need a remedy, and unless it Is set in, motion within the immediate
future, greedy officials will have submerged the already overburdened
and overtaxed public to such depths that it will be impossible for, not
only the present generation, but generations to follow, to overcome
such a stigma, and consequently the advancement of society and the
progress of educational units will be everlastingly retarded.

H. W. VINCENT.

